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Crises, Economic Integration and Growth Collapses in African Countries 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to explore the effects of crises and openness on a large sample of 
African countries. Focusing on sudden stops, currency, twin and sovereign debt crises, the paper 
shows that crises are associated with growth collapses in Africa. In contrast, openness is found to 
be beneficial to growth. More specifically, consistent with standard Mundell-Flemming type 
models, greater openness to trade and financial flows is found to mitigate the adverse effects of 
crises. These findings are robust to various measures of both openness and crises as well as to 
endogeneity concerns. 
 
1  Introduction 
It is largely accepted that trade and financial openness can increase the propagation of business 
cycle fluctuations among countries, making them more vulnerable to contagion. However, 
notwithstanding the potential risks associated with globalisation, an increasing number of 
African countries have embarked on policies of trade and financial liberalisation under the 
auspices of IMF and World Bank sponsored stabilisation programmes (Zagha and Nankani, 
2005). As a result, Africa is more integrated into the global economic system today than it was 
few decades ago. Yet, like developing countries in other regions, African economies have also 
encountered their share of economic and financial crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).1 As 
recent global events illustrate, crises can have devastating effects on economic activity and can 
hit countries with weak, and even sometimes those with strong, macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Thus, economists and policy-makers are increasingly concerned with understanding the genesis, 
                                                     
1 In fact, during 1970 to 2007, the African region has, in absolute numbers, encountered more systemic 
banking and currency crises than any other region (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
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evolution and consequences of economic crises. 
The objective of this study is to explore how crises and openness to both trade and 
financial flows affect economic growth in Africa. More specifically, we examine whether greater 
openness to trade and financial flows exacerbates or lessens the adverse effects of financial 
crises. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explore the effects of both crises and openness 
on growth performance in the context of African countries, while the existing literature has 
focused mainly on emerging markets or has used cross-country data covering a smaller number 
of African countries (e.g. Aguiar, 2005; Joyce and Nabar, 2009). As far as we are aware, no 
paper has examined the interactive effect of crises and openness on economic growth. We also 
distinguish between four different types of crises, namely, sudden stops, currency, twin and 
sovereign debt crises.  
A ‘sudden stop’ in capital inflows is a type of crisis in which access to foreign capital is 
abruptly and severely curtailed, precipitating large swings in the capital account of the balance of 
payments. It is closely associated with current account reversals (from large deficits to smaller 
deficits/ surpluses), reserve depletion, growth collapses as well as currency and sovereign debt 
crises (Calvo, 1998)2. A currency crisis, on the other hand, occurs when investors substitute 
away from a particular country’s assets in anticipation of a potential depreciation of the currency, 
while a sovereign debt crisis involves a default or restructuring of debt obligations. Twin crises, 
first coined by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), arise when currency crises are followed by 
banking crises. As shown by, for instance, Bordo et al. (2001), twins tend to have much more 
                                                     
2 Sudden stops and the accompanying liquidity constraints imply that the current account must be abruptly 
adjusted (i.e. the deficit should be reduced or reversed). This can be avoided by drawing down or depleting the 
reserve holdings of the central bank, provided there are enough reserves and the central bank is willing to do so 
(however, reserve depletion may initiate currency crises) or, alternatively, by seeking emergency funding from 
international financial institutions. In any case, a current account reversal can be very painful, as labour and 
goods markets tend to be inflexible in the short-run. 
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harmful effects on the economy relative to either currency or banking crises on their own. The 
different types of crises may hit simultaneously, as they may be triggered off by common 
underlying factors, and one crisis may also help precipitate another. 
The results of this study show that financial crises are associated with growth collapses in 
Africa. In contrast, economic openness is found to be beneficial to growth. More specifically, we 
find that, consistent with standard Mundell-Flemming type models, greater openness to trade and 
financial flows tends to mitigate the adverse effects of crises. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the 
openness-crisis relationship. Section 3 presents the data and methods used. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the results, while the main findings are placed in a broader context in Section 5. 
Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2  The openness-crisis interaction 
One can identify two opposing hypotheses as to whether economic and financial integration 
mitigate or exacerbate the adverse effects of financial crises. On the one hand, some have argued 
that openness can be an important crisis amplifier, in that it can expose countries to external 
shocks, while others suggest that it can act as a crisis buffer insofar as it can help accommodate 
external shocks. 
 
Openness as a crisis amplifier 
As summarised by Cavallo and Frankel (2008), a number of arguments have been put forward in 
support of the view that openness to trade can trigger or exacerbate crises. In particular, countries 
that are more integrated into the global economy are more likely to be subject to external shocks 
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emanating from, for example, trading partners. As a result, these economies are more prone to 
export collapses and/or diminishing trade credits which in turn can trigger sudden stops and other 
types of crises. Empirical findings by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) and Easterly et al. (2001) 
suggest that openness to trade is closely linked to output volatility and a higher likelihood of 
external crises. 
With respect to capital account openness, economists such as Stiglitz argue that it can 
aggravate pre-existing market distortions caused by informational asymmetries, credit market 
imperfections, poor institutions and moral hazards, increasing the likelihood of crises (Stiglitz, 
2000). While the overwhelming majority of economists, including Stiglitz, remain in favour of 
long-term private capital inflows (e.g. foreign direct investment), many point to the destabilising 
effects of volatile and pro-cyclical surges in inflows. Hence, it has been argued that capital 
account openness may lead to increased inflows of short term capital and a higher risk of abrupt 
reversals (Agenor, 2004). Others assert that capital movements, as a result of financial openness, 
may increase macroeconomic instability (e.g. upward pressures on the exchange rates, asset price 
bubbles, credit booms, higher inflation, consumption growth volatility) and lead to the presence 
of more short-term, high risk speculative capital in the economy (Arestis, 2005). 
 
Openness as a crisis buffer 
The idea that openness to trade can lower the probability of crises or, alternatively, lessen the 
adverse effects of external crises is not new in economics. For instance, a number of studies have 
postulated that there is an inverse relationship between trade openness and default probabilities 
(Schimmelpfennig et al. 2003; Borensztein and Panizza, 2009). More precisely, countries with 
higher trade activities are less likely to default on their international obligations since their 
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trading partners could impose harsh sanctions on them in the event of a default (Rose, 2005). 
An alternative argument suggests that trade openness lessens the adjustment costs 
associated with external crises. In particular, it has been suggested that open economies are more 
likely to ‘export their way out of a crisis’. This was first noted by Sachs (1985) who observed 
that in the early 1980s Latin American countries were subject to numerous debt crises, in spite of 
having similar levels of debt to GDP ratios to those of Asian countries, precisely because of their 
lower trade openness and hence their inability to generate foreign exchange to service their debt. 
Focusing on Latin American and Asian countries, Guidotti et al. (2004) have also shown that 
countries with open trade regimes tend to have better growth performance and quicker recoveries 
in the face of sudden stop crises than those with closed economies. 
How trade openness reduces the adjustment costs of external shocks has been elaborated 
by, among others, Edwards (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2008), Calvo et al. (2003) and 
Ripoll-i-Alcon (2010). Suppose that an economy has to abruptly adjust to a shock of a given 
percentage of GDP (e.g. a sudden stop episode). In the first instance, assume that 
expenditure-switching policies are not possible (i.e. the exchange rate is fixed). In this case, the 
country must implement spending cuts to satisfy its intertemporal resource constraint and thus 
run a current account surplus. In the standard Keynesian and Mundell-Flemming type of models, 
the severity of the adjustment is negatively related to the marginal propensity to import, with a 
higher propensity implying lower adjustment costs. Thus, more open economies would, ceteris 
paribus, suffer a less severe contraction.3 
Similar conclusions can be reached if one uses traditional tradable/nontradable models. 
To illustrate this, assume that it is now possible for the country to implement 
                                                     
3 Output losses would be inevitable if wages and prices are rigid. This is more likely to be the case in the 
short-run. 
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expenditure-switching policies. In this case, to improve the trade balance, the relative price of 
non-tradables must fall. Hence, the needed adjustment can, at least in part, be achieved through a 
nominal and real depreciation of the exchange rate. This would in turn, following sticky-price 
open economy models and conventional Mundell-Fleming type models, improve the recovery of 
the economy through increased competitiveness.4 It is noted that, as emphasised by Cavallo and 
Frankel (2008), the required devaluation may not be large for countries with higher trade to GDP 
ratios and, in turn, the balance sheet effects need not be large. However, openness tends to 
require more nominal devaluation for the same real devaluation because of the greater weight of 
imports in consumption. Consequently, the prediction is that, ceteris paribus, more open 
countries can mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks better than closed economies, which 
are more likely to end up in a recession due to the need to implement more severe adjustments. 
Recent experiences from emerging markets, however, show that the effect of depreciation on 
output can in fact be contractionary particularly when there is a currency mismatch brought 
about by the so-called “original sin”.5 As shown by a number of theoretical (see for example, 
Aghion et al. 2001) and empirical contributions (see for example, Aguiar, 2005 on Mexico), the 
balance sheet effects of a depreciation can cause output contraction as a result of dwindling firm 
net worth.  
As for financial integration, Edwards (2004) and references cited therein postulate that 
financial openness, as trade integration, tends to reduce the adjustment costs of external shocks 
and thus enables the economy to recover more quickly.6 
                                                     
4 For a survey, see Lane (2001). The beneficial effects of the depreciation would depend on a number of 
factors, including whether the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. 
5 This refers to the situation where developing countries cannot get loans denominated in their own currencies 
from international financial markets. Thus, a depreciation/ devaluation of their currencies would make the 
value of their liabilities rise. These balance sheet effects would reduce the net worth of firms. 
6 A careful examination of the existing literature, however, indicates that, under fairly standard assumptions, 
8 
 
As our discussion regarding the two competing hypotheses indicates, the openness-crisis 
interaction can only be settled empirically. In this study, we examine whether African countries 
that are more open to trade and financial flows suffer smaller reductions in output following 
external shocks relative to more closed ones. In other words, are open African economies more 
likely to accommodate external shocks? 
 
3  Data and methodology 
3.1  Data 
Following Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) among others, we want to explore the medium to 
long-term effects of crises on output growth. To this end, we construct a panel dataset on a 
maximum of 41 African countries and 8 non-overlapping 5-year period averages from 1970-74 
through 2005-09. In line with the existing literature, the data are averaged to reduce business 
cycle effects. Table A1 in the Appendix provides full definitions and sources of all the variables. 
The model we estimate takes the following form: 
 
ittiititititit
XEOCRyg  
 221110
= , (1) 
where for Ni 1,...=  and ,1,...= Tt  
it
y denotes the real GDP per capita for country i  at time 
t , itg is the growth rate (% p.a.) defined as   11100  ititit yyy , itCR  and itEO  denote our 
measures of crises and economic integration, respectively, i  is a time invariant 
country-specific fixed effect, t  is a time specific effect and it  is the error term. We are 
interested in testing whether the marginal effects of crisis and openness on growth, 
1  and 2 , 
are statistically significant. 
The itX  is a set of standard control variables, largely drawn from the existing literature, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
financial openness may in fact result in greater instability (see for example Kim et al. 2012 for a review). 
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which include inflation. In line with the seminal contribution by Beck et al. (2000), we account 
for the role of financial development in economic growth. We use the ratio of liquid liabilities to 
GDP as an indicator of financial development. We include population growth to control for the 
demographic trends of African countries. As suggested by Barro (1996), high population growth 
can have a negative effect on growth through its impacts on the dependency ratio and quality of 
human capital. Finally, we control for the level of indebtedness since it may play an important 
role in the relationship between crises and growth. In particular, we wish to test whether crises 
are significantly harmful to growth even after controlling for one of the most important correlates 
of crises, namely ‘debt overhang’. 
     We then extend our analysis by allowing the growth effect of crises to vary with the level 
of economic integration. We do this by interacting the crisis measures with indicators of 
openness, as follows:  
 
ittiititititititit
XEOCREOCRyg  
 2121110
)(=  (2) 
A good way to understand how growth reacts to external shocks in countries with varying 
levels of openness is to examine the marginal effect from equation (2):  
 it
it
it EO
CR
g
11
=
)(
 


 (3) 
Thus, we interpret the signs of the coefficients of itCR  and the interaction term as follows: if 
0<1  and 0>1 , this would confirm the hypothesis that openness acts as a crisis buffer, 
which would suggest that the adverse effects of crises are decreasing with the level of economic 
integration. On the other hand, if 0<1  and 0<1 , this would confirm the hypothesis that 
economic integration can amplify the negative effects of crises on output growth. 
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Crisis indicators 
To identify episodes of sudden stop crises, we closely follow the work of Guidotti et al. (2004) 
and Calvo et al. (2004) to define a sudden stop as a fall in the financial account that is at least 
one standard deviation below the sample mean and more than 5 percent of the country’s GDP. 
However, we impose an additional requirement in that we require the episode to be disruptive. 
One way to do this is to follow the procedure by Hutchison and Noy (2006). They focus on 
episodes that coincide with other types of crises. Our approach is broader and requires the 
episode to coincide with, or be followed by, other forms of financial crises, namely, currency and 
debt crises. In this way, our measure of a sudden stop reflects not only changes in the mood of 
global capital markets, but also how harmful the episode might be. Hence, we use a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a sudden stop in a country during a particular year 
and 0 otherwise.7 
We also make use of similar dummy variables capturing the incidence of currency and 
sovereign debt crises. Our currency crisis measure is based on that of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), who define it as an annual depreciation (local currency vs US dollar) of 15 percent or 
more. Our sovereign debt crisis measure comes from the same source and is defined as a failure 
to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or specified grace period) including 
rescheduling of debt agreements irrespective of the nature of any new terms.8 
Following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001), we also consider the 
                                                     
7 Our crisis dummies are defined for each year first and then averaged over five years. That is, they appear as 
the ratios of crisis years to total years (5 years) to capture the duration aspect of crises. Our results are robust to 
the use of binary indicators.  
8 A shortcoming of this crisis-measure in the context of many low-income countries is that it does not capture 
the dynamic nature of external crises. For example, prior to the HIPC initiative, interest arrears were applied to 
official borrowing which was eventually rescheduled. Moreover, some of the countries that were included in 
the HIPC process were deemed to have implemented reform measures during the period in which they were 
accumulating debt arrears. We owe this point to one of the referees. 
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effects of the joint (‘twin’) occurrence of banking and currency crises on output growth in 
Africa9. The data on banking crises come from the dataset by Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
Finally, to capture the severity and intensity of financial crises, we construct a composite crisis 
index, which can take on a value between 0 and 4, depending on the number of types of crises 
encountered by a country in a particular year. For example, in 1992 Nigeria simultaneously 
experienced a sudden stop episode with currency, twin, and sovereign debt crises. Hence, we 
award Nigeria an index score of 4 for that particular year. We then weigh the index by the share 
of each country’s GDP in world output. A similar procedure has been adopted by Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2010). The composite index is our preferred indicator as it captures whether 
simultaneously encountering different types of crises has an additional adverse effect on growth, 
above and beyond the adverse effect of each crisis individually. 
Using the definitions and sources detailed above, we identify - out of 1880 observations - 
a total of 202 currency crises, 172 sovereign debt crises, 249 sudden stop episodes and 56 twin 
crises (banking and currency). Figure 1 shows the distribution of currency crises over time. It 
seems that the highest number of currency crises were recorded in 1994, when the CFA franc 
was devalued by 50%. The occurrence of sovereign debt crises peaked during the mid to late 
1980s (Figure 2), while a significant number of countries experienced sudden stop episodes from 
the late 1970s onwards (Figure 3). Twin crises were the least frequent type of crisis during the 
sample period, occurring mostly in the 1990s (Figure 4). Over the sample period, the three 
countries that have encountered most currency crises are Zimbabwe (21 years out of 40 years), 
Ghana (20) and Angola (20) while Cape Verde and Liberia have not experienced any. With 
regards to sudden stops, the top three are Sierra Leone (23), Mali (21) and Swaziland (20), while 
                                                     
9 We do not consider the effects of banking crises separately since the vast majority of the sample countries 
experienced a “near-permanent banking stress” throughout most of the study period (Kane and Rice, 2001). 
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Equatorial Guinea has not experienced any. Finally, the top three sovereign crisis-hit countries 
are the Central African Republic (28), Cote d’Ivoire (26) and Angola (20) while around a quarter 
of the countries have not experienced any sovereign debt crises. 
(Figures 1 - 4 here)  
 
Openness indicators 
We utilise several measures of economic and financial openness. We use the economic 
dimension of the globalisation index created by Dreher (2006).10 It is a weighted index of actual 
economic flows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and income payments to 
foreign nationals each measured as a percentage of GDP) and their restrictions (hidden import 
barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions). This is our 
preferred indicator since it captures the degree to which economies are connected to the rest of 
the world. As sensitivity tests, we also employ the actual economic flows sub-index from the 
same dataset and the share of trade (sum of exports and imports) in GDP, each capturing 
different aspects of cross border transactions. To measure financial openness, we use the de jure 
index of capital account openness proposed by Chinn and Ito (2008). This measure is the first 
principal component of four binary dummy variables related to restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions. 
 
3.2  Methodology 
As a benchmark case, we carry out panel estimations without the interaction of crisis and 
openness based on (i) a pooled OLS model without controlling for country and time fixed effects 
                                                     
10 This is commonly known as the KOF index as it is hosted by the KOF (Konjunkturforschungsstelle) Swiss 
Economic Institute.   
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as well as (ii) a fixed effects model where unobservable country fixed effects and time fixed 
effects are included. However, a particular issue of concern in estimating our model (equation 1 
or 2) is endogeneity bias which may arise from omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse 
causality in the relationship between crisis or economic integration and economic growth. To 
overcome this, we use the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators proposed by 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In particular, we use the system GMM (SGMM) 
dynamic panel estimator, which has been shown to have superior finite sample properties.11  
 
4  Results 
4.1 Exploring the data 
Before econometric results are presented, this subsection explores the data to give an overview 
of growth performance during crisis episodes. We first conduct a basic event analysis where we 
examine whether a crisis event is accompanied by an output loss or growth collapse (e.g. 
Eichengreen et al. 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996). The existing literature defines an output loss 
or growth collapse as the deviation of actual output or its growth from its potential trend (Bordo 
et al. 2001; Boyd et al. 2005; Gupta et al., 2007). As is standard in the literature, we estimate the 
output trend based on a 5-year pre-crisis period ending 3 years prior to each crisis event using 
Hodrick-Prescott smoothed output series. However, in many cases, we end up with negative 
growth trends (Abiad et al. 2009; Angkinand, 2008).12 To solve this, Abiad et al. extend the 
pre-crisis period back until a positive trend is achieved (10 to 20 years back) while Angkinand 
sets all the negative 3-year pre-crisis growth rates to zero. 
                                                     
11 See Baltagi (2013) for technical details.  
12 Negative trends would suggest that output falls indefinitely even in the absence of a shock (see Abiad et al. 
2009). 
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     In this study, we opt for an alternative strategy which imposes as few restrictive 
assumptions as possible. In particular, we ask a question: How does output growth behave before, 
during, and after the crisis period? A simple way to do this is to compare the actual growth rates 
in period T (onset of a crisis) to T₋₁,..,T₋₅ (pre-crisis window) and T₊₁,..,T₊₅ (post crisis period). 
Figure 5 shows that debt crises tend to be associated with greater output collapses in Africa. This 
is in line with Andersson and Karpestam (2014) who found that debt crises have been more 
harmful to output growth in Africa than any other types of crisis. Figure 5 suggests that sudden 
stop episodes tend to be preceded by a boom and output tends to suffer a small contraction. Our 
finding that sudden stops occur on the back of boom times is consistent with the view that 
developing countries tend to experience capital inflow bonanzas during good times (or 
procyclicality) to be driven, for instance, by a strong surge in global commodity prices (Reinhart 
and Reinhart, 2008). Consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the figure indicates that 
currency crises are, on average, associated with mild contractions. In addition, in the case of 
currency crises, post-crisis growth tends to be higher than the pre-crisis level. This may be the 
outcome of the pro-competitive effects of the exchange rates. Unlike in the other cases, growth 
tends to be poor in the run-up to twin crises, but the onset of crisis itself is not associated with a 
growth collapse. Despite diversity across different types of crisis in the relationship between 
crisis and growth performance, Figure 5 implies the overall negative relation between crisis and 
growth, which will be investigated in detail in Section 4.2.     
(Figure 5 here)  
However, it should be emphasised that pooling the growth performance around crisis 
episodes across the sample countries only captures the overall trend and does not represent the 
experiences of all countries. In an attempt to show how particular countries perform when they 
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encounter crises, we depict the experiences of selected economies in Figures A1-A4 in 
Appendix. As can be seen in these figures, financial crises can coincide with growth collapses 
(e.g. Guinea-Bissau in 2002). Alternatively, they can occur either during a period of sluggish 
growth (e.g. Niger in 1983) or on the back of a good performance (e.g. Ethiopia in 1998). 
However, crises can coincide with impressive growth rates (e.g. Mozambique in 1987). It should 
be thus noted that our econometric estimates for coefficients of key variables show only overall 
relationships of key variables and do not necessarily reflect the experience of individual 
countries. Table A1 in Appendix reports the summary statistics of all the variables used in the 
estimations.      
 
4.2  Baseline regression results 
As a starting point to generalise the results on the effects of crisis on growth, we explore the 
effects of crisis and openness on economic growth in Table 1 without taking account of 
interaction between crisis and openness. The results in the first five columns are based on the 
pooled OLS estimator. Across the five regressions, we augment our growth model with the five 
different indicators of crisis described above, along with our preferred measure of economic 
integration. The estimated coefficients of economic integration are all positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that economic integration is associated with better growth performance. 
Consistent with the existing literature, a sudden stop crisis is harmful to output growth. 
Similarly, the rest of the financial crisis indicators are inversely related to growth, the 
coefficients of these variables being statistically significant at the 5% level. In the last five 
columns of Table 1, we re-estimate the same models using the fixed effects panel estimator to 
capture the within-country variation in output growth. The results remain largely the same. 
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Hence, these findings indicate that crises disrupt economic activity, while openness, perhaps by 
relaxing credit constraints and thus improving capital accumulation, is beneficial to economic 
growth performance. 
(Table 1 here) 
In general terms, all the control variables are consistent with our prior expectations. More 
specifically, initial income is mostly significant and negative, confirming the conditional 
convergence hypothesis. In line with the so-called ‘debt overhang’ hypothesis, we obtain 
negative and generally significant coefficients of external debt. There is no evidence to support 
the idea that inflation or population growth has a significant influence on growth, while financial 
depth is found to be significantly associated with growth in a few cases of pooled OLS.   
However, a legitimate concern with these results is that some of the right hand side 
variables may be endogenously related to growth. A particular source of endogeneity which may 
plague our baseline model is reverse causality. For example, it is likely that the level of 
economic integration may change with the growth performance of the economy, so that countries 
may open up their current and capital accounts precisely because of improved domestic growth 
performance. To overcome these concerns, we re-estimate the baseline regressions in Table 1 
using the two-step SGMM. The results are reported in Table 2. 
(Table 2 here) 
Even if endogeneity concerns are addressed, economic integration retains its positive and 
significant effect on growth. Across all specifications, the coefficients of this variable are 
significant at the 1% level, confirming that openness matters for growth in Africa. The results 
imply that an increase in trade and investment flows by one percentage point of GDP is, on 
average, associated with an increase in real per capita GDP growth rate of 0.28 to 0.36 
17 
 
percentage points, which appear to be substantial. On the other hand, the evidence that crises are 
detrimental to economic performance has been further confirmed in Table 2. The results suggest 
that currency crisis has a stronger depressing impact on output growth than the other types of 
crises, closely followed by twin crises, sudden stops and sovereign debt. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of our composite measure, which captures the intensity with which countries 
encounter multiple crises, is somewhat lower than the other crisis indicators but, nonetheless, 
negative and highly significant.   
The three specification tests are all well-behaved. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid. Similarly, the 
difference-in-Hansen test fails to reject the null that the orthogonality conditions derived from 
the levels equation are appropriate. Finally, the regressions pass the second order serial 
correlation test, confirming that there is no second-order serial correlation in the error term of the 
first-differenced equation. Hence, these tests support the validity and consistency of the SGMM 
estimator. 
 
4.3  Varying the impact of crises across levels of openness 
In order to investigate whether the level of economic integration influences the relationship 
between crises and growth, we interact the openness variable with our crisis indicators. The 
results are summarised in Table 3. 
(Table 3 here) 
Regression [1] shows that sudden stop episodes have a highly significant negative 
association with economic growth. On the other hand, openness has a significant beneficial 
effect on economic performance. The coefficient of the interaction term carries a significant 
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positive sign, suggesting that economic integration mitigates the adverse effects of a sudden stop 
crisis. So a highly open economy, such as South Africa with an average openness to GDP ratio 
of 0.60, would be able to avoid any output losses around sudden stops.13 On the other hand, in a 
period of crisis, the output growth of the least open economy (i.e. Rwanda with an average 
openness to GDP ratio of 0.16) would drop by more than four percentage points.14 
In regression [2], we consider currency crises, which are found to be inversely related to 
output growth. When we interact this variable with openness, we find a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate. This implies that openness tends to attenuate the negative relationship 
between currency crises and growth. Economic integration itself retains its positive and 
significant sign. Regression [3] examines how debt crises relate to growth. The coefficient of this 
type of crisis is negative and highly significant. This suggests that debt crises, similar to the other 
types of crises, is detrimental to growth. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant, indicating that the more an African economy is integrated with the rest of the world, 
the weaker the negative association between debt crises and economic performance. The pattern 
is the same across the remaining specifications, the coefficients of our indicators of twin crisis 
and composite crisis measures both being negative and significant at the 1% level, with the 
interaction positive and significant. 
To sum up, in line with both theoretical and empirical literature, our results show that 
financial crises are associated with output losses. Our findings also indicate that the crisis-growth 
relationship is conditional on the openness of the country to trade. More specifically, in open 
countries, the harmful impacts of crises are lessened. This is not the case in closed economies. 
                                                     
13 The overall growth effect following a sudden stop for South Africa would be given by the following 
equation; 0.954=1000.60)(0.1135.826  (%). 
14  Following the marginal effect equation, for Rwanda this is calculated as: 
4.018=1000.16)(0.1135.826  (%). 
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This suggests that open countries tend to experience a smoother adjustment following an external 
shock, perhaps driven by the performance of the tradable goods sector. It could also be the case 
that countries more integrated with the rest of the world have more room to manoeuvre by 
international partners (e.g. trade credits). These opportunities may not be available to more 
closed economies. 
 
4.4  Alternative measures of openness 
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of openness indicator, we use various 
other measures that capture the degree to which economies are integrated with the rest of the 
world. For the sake of brevity, Table 4 contains only the results for our variables of interest (i.e. 
measures of openness, crises and their interaction terms)15. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 4, 
our previous findings remain largely robust when we use ‘cross border transactions’ as a measure 
of openness. Our measures of crises retain their expected negative signs and are statistically 
significant. More importantly, the interaction effects remain positive and generally statistically 
significant.  
(Table 4 here) 
     In panel B of Table 4, we apply trade openness as an indicator of economic integration and 
the results are broadly in line with our previous findings. The coefficients of trade openness and 
crises carry the expected signs and are significant in all specifications. Similarly, crisis has a 
negative and significant effect on economic growth. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive and generally significant. Overall, these findings tend to support the view that openness 
can mitigate the negative effects of crises. 
     We also consider other openness measures that exclusively focus on the capital account. 
                                                     
15 The regressions include all the control variables. 
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Interestingly, when we use the Chinn and Ito measure of capital account openness (Panel C) we 
find that it is statistically insignificant. This is perhaps not too surprising since this indicator is a 
‘de jure’ measure, solely focusing on restrictions on the capital account. However, the coefficient 
estimates of financial crisis and its interaction term with capital account opnness are in line with 
our previous results, that is, the former is ngative and significant and the latter is positive (and  
significant in Columns [11] and [12]). In line with theoretical predictions, financial openness is 
found to reduce the negative impact of crises on econmic growth.16 17 
 
4.5  Further robustness checks 
As a further robustness check, we have re-estimated the model either by (i) including a further 
control variable, (ii) estimating quantile regressions, (iii) repeating the main regressions for 
sub-samples, and (iv) including the lag of crisis, or multiple crisis dummy to test the stability of 
coefficient estimates of our key explanatory variables. In these cases, we use our preferred 
measures of openness and crisis, namely, economic integration (proxied by the economic 
dimension of the KOF index) and the composite crisis indicator as well as sudden stops. First, 
our main results are found to be mostly robust to inclusion of an additional control variable, such 
                                                     
16Given that the within-country variation in openness is likely to be smaller than the cross-country variation 
and it may reflect other factors, such as real exchange rate changes (Bleaney and Tian, 2014), we have 
re-estimated the same models by pooled OLS. The overall pattern of the results is similar, but we have found 
only for sudden stop and currency crisis that openness becomes statistically insignificant, while the interaction 
is positive and significant in Panels A and B and the interaction of capital account openness and crisis becomes 
statistically insignificant in Panel C (Appendix Table A2).   
17As a further extension, we have used, as an alternative to the Chinn-Ito index, (i) the financial openness 
indicator of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) - measuring the external assets and liabilities of economies as a 
share of GDP- and (ii) FDI liabilities (Kose et al., 2009). In case of the former, positive and mostly significant 
coefficients are found for openness across different specifications, while crisis remains negative and 
significant, except in the case where ‘currency crisis’ is used. The interaction term is positive in all the five 
cases, but statistically significant only for ‘sudden stop’ and ‘composite index’. The latter (using FDI liabilities 
as an alternative openness measure) suggests that, while crisis exerts a statistically significant negative effect 
on growth, openness is positive and significant, with their interaction positive and mostly significant. These 
results are broadly consistent with the results in Table 4, but will have to be interpreted carefully as both 
variables are rather poor proxies for financial openness in the context of our study.   
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as political or institutional variables.18 19 Second, there could be parameter heterogeneity across 
the conditional growth distribution, so that countries in the higher growth quantiles may respond 
differently to both crises and economic integration than do countries whose growth rates are in 
the lower quantiles. To explore this, the first two columns of Table 5 are based on quantile 
regressions using composite index of crisis where we report both the 25 th quantile (low growth) 
and the 75 th quantile of the growth distribution (corresponding to “the high growth group”). 
Interestingly, we find that high growth performers tend to benefit significantly from openness 
while poor performers do not as much. In addition, the coefficient estimate of openness for the 
high growth group is more than twice as large as that for the low growth group. The results also 
suggest that the adverse impact of crises on output growth is significantly different from zero for 
both groups. More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant 
for both groups. Overall, our main results remain unchanged. With regard to other results, initial 
GDP is negative and significant for both groups with a coefficient estimate much larger in an 
absolute term for the high growth group. The speed of convergence is thus observed generally 
stronger among the high growth group countries than among the low growth group countries.         
Thirdly, we have carried out a number of sensitivity test by estimating the same model 
for various subsets of countries (columns [3]-[6]). The negative link between crises and growth 
                                                     
18More specifically, we have included (i) political and institutional variables, such as regime type, polity, or 
political rights (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003; Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010), (ii) reserve holdings or terms of trade 
on growth (Li and Ouyang, 2011) , (iii) government size, or (iv) consumption volatility, but these are 
statistically insignificant except in the case of reserve holdings. The pattern of our main results is unchanged, 
though in the case where reserve holdings or terms of trade is added, economic integration gets statistically 
insignificant (though its interaction with crisis is positive and significant). Details will be provided on request.  
19 Another potentially important issue is that our currency crisis variable may capture high inflation when 
genuine currency crises were accompanied by rapid currency depreciation. To test this effect, we have added a 
dummy variable for high-inflation cases defined based on various cut-off points (e.g. 7%; 10%; 15%) or 
country-specific historical benchmarks. The results indicate that inclusion of high inflation dummies does not 
change the results significantly. We have also tested whether the 1994 CFA devaluation has different effects 
from other crises, but we have found that the 1994 CFA devaluation dummy is statistically insignificant. These 
results will be furnished on request. 
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that we have found so far could be due to the presence of resource-rich countries since these may 
be more prone to crises but also more integrated with the rest of the world. Hence, we examine 
whether our central findings survive if we focus on resource-poor countries (column [3]), or 
resource-rich countries (column [4]). In the former, we have removed the countries whose 
exports are dominated by oil (Equatorial Guinea, Congo Rep., Angola, Gabon, Chad and 
Nigeria) and minerals (Mauritania and Zambia), and in the latter only these countries are used.20  
Because of the small sample size, the result for resource-rich countries will have to be interpreted 
with caution as this case passes specification tests only marginally. It is noted, however, that the 
main results are unchanged for both resource-rich and resource-poor countries - with a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient estimate for crises and a positive and significant estimate 
for openness as well as for the interaction term. Economic integration has a relatively larger 
effect on growth of resource-rich countries, while their integration to the rest of the economy will 
mitigate the negative effect of crisis to a larger extent as those countries tend to have closer links 
with trade partners. Initial GDP carries a more negative and significant coefficient, suggesting a 
generally faster convergence for resource-rich countries than for resource-poor countries.     
As previously emphasised by a number of studies (e.g. Loayza and Ranciere, 2006), one 
of the most important transmission channels between crises and output growth is the financial 
system. Accordingly, it could be the case that our results are driven by countries with more 
developed financial systems. The regression result reported in column [5] is based on a 
sub-sample of countries with relatively weak financial systems. Again, the interaction term 
between crises and openness is positive and significant, implying that openness tends to lessen 
the disruptive effects of crisis on output growth, even in the absence of sophisticated financial 
systems. We also examine whether our findings are true for those countries with greater 
                                                     
20 We owe this point as well as the selection of sub-groups of countries to one of the referees.  
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restrictions on trade. This sample of ‘closed’ economies is selected based on levels of tariffs 
(column [6]). As the result shows, the main results remain unchanged. It should be noted that the 
size of coefficient of the interaction term is relatively larger for both countries with “weak 
finance” and those with “closed economies”. That is, the relative advantages of opening up the 
economy to the rest of the world in mitigating the negative effects of external shocks will be 
larger for these countries.21 
An important question is whether crises were caused by withdrawals of official lending to 
African governments, or by periodic deteriorations of confidence in private international 
financial markets. It should be noted, however, that due to data limitations, we cannot distinguish 
crises associated with official, as opposed to private international finance. Given data limitations, 
we have carried out sensitivity analyses for ‘sudden stops’ as these are likely to be associated 
mainly with private international finance that would normally be pertinent to relatively rich or 
resource-rich countries (columns [7]-[9]). As expected, richer countries benefit more from 
economic integration, but sudden stops affect more negatively low growth groups than high 
growth groups with the interactive effect larger for the former in the absolute term ([7] and [8]). 
Resource poor countries tend to be hit severely by sudden stops. If sudden stops are mainly 
associated with private international finance, it will be safe to conclude that low-growth 
countries or resource poor countries tend to be negatively affected by crises and economic 
integration will mitigate the negative effects regardless of whether the crises originted from 
public or private finance. The pattern of the coefficient estimates of initial GDP is also 
unchanged. For instance, faster convergence is found for the high growth group, than for the low 
                                                     
21 We have also divided our sample countries into two groups, based on the prevailing exchange rate regime 
as the exchange rate regime of a country may influence the relationship between crises and output (e.g. Esaka, 
2010). The main results are unchanged for countries with ‘semi flexible’ regimes (i.e. those with either 
crawling/managed floated or pure floated). The interaction term loses its significance for those with 
‘fixed/pegged’ exchange rates, while crisis is negative and significant.   
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growth group. Hence, our main conclusion appears to be robust regardless of the sources of 
finance and the definitions of crisis.  
Furthermore, we have tested whether there is any persistent effect of crisis by inserting a 
lagged composite crisis index. Column [10] shows that the lagged crisis is positive and 
significant, suggesting that there is a bounce-back after a crisis, rather than a persistent effect. 
We have also tested whether having multiple crises has an effect by adding an ‘any crisis’ 
dummy (taking the value of 1 if any of the crises occurred) to the composite crisis index 
(Column [11]). In this case both the composite index and ‘any crisis’ are negative and 
significant, suggesting that having multiple crises has an additional negative effect on growth.    
In sum, we find that financial crises are associated with output losses. However, this 
negative effect decreases with the level of openness regardless of specifications, or of selection 
of sub-samples. Our results also suggest that economic integration, perhaps by relaxing credit 
constraints, helps economies to overcome the adverse effects of financial crises on economic 
performance. The beneficial effects of openness on growth in Africa is in line with the findings 
of Brückner and Lederman (2012) and Chang and Mendy (2012). 
With respect to financial openness, Fowowe (2008) shows that there is a significant and 
robust positive relationship between economic growth and financial liberalisation policies in his 
sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, Ahmed (2011) provides evidence that 
financial integration has had a positive (albeit not statistically significant) direct impact on output 
growth in Africa. However, he finds that financial openness in Africa has had a positive and 
robust effect on African financial markets and thereby indirectly benefitted their growth 
performance. Lastly, the SGMM diagnostics are satisfactory throughout the sensitivity analysis. 
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5. The main findings in a broader context 
Our first main result is that international economic integration has been beneficial to our sample 
of African countries. This is in line with long held view in economics that increased international 
trade can propel countries to a high-growth trajectory. Standard trade theory, for example, 
postulates that trade openness is associated with static gains as it provides greater scope for the 
accumulation of human and physical capital. In particular, openness can facilitate economies to 
allocate their resources more efficiently by providing market platforms which allow economies 
of scale and division of labour to take place – increasing total factor productivity. Moreover, 
endogenous growth theories (e.g. Romer, 1994) predict that opening up trade enables countries 
to acquire new technologies, skills, knowledge and various other positive externalities which can 
bring about dynamic gains resulting in higher economic growth. 
     Similarly, an extensive theoretical literature identifies various direct and indirect channels 
through which financial openness can foster higher productivity and improve economic 
performance. Kose et al. (2009) contend that financial integration can increase capital 
accumulation by relaxing credit constraints and augmenting domestic resources. In addition, 
openness to financial flows can promote more efficient capital allocation as a result of increased 
risk-sharing opportunities which enables firms to undertake more risky but high-return 
investments (Obstfeld, 1994). As the volume of capital increases, the cost of capital should fall 
since the domestic economy becomes more liquid (Prasad et al. 2003).  
The second main finding of this paper is that crises have been harmful to output growth 
in African economies, presumably due to their adverse effects on domestic capital formation, 
labour market, exchange rates, asset prices, aggregate demand, and total factor productivity. As 
emphasised, for instance, by Korinek (2011), crises cause self-reinforcing ‘financial 
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amplification’ effects in which countries can be caught in a vicious circle of falling prices 
(exchange rates and asset prices), deteriorating balance sheets and decreasing aggregate demand. 
More specifically, crises, particularly those that come in the form of capital reversals, sudden 
stops and currency crises, are associated with sharp falls in the exchange rate and asset prices. 
This, in turn, worsens domestic firms’ balance sheets by undermining their collateral value and 
net worth, further reducing their ability to borrow and invest owing to reduced access to credit. 
These effects tend to be amplified in environments where there is credit scarcity, high liability 
dollarization and financial market imperfections. In crisis-hit countries, lack of credit availability 
reduces aggregate demand by tightening the budget constraints of agents, so decreasing their 
consumption and investment levels. The tendency of crises to undermine investor confidence can 
arise, not only from lack of credit availability, but also from increased risk and uncertainty. In 
addition, in Keynesian settings where prices/wages are downward sticky, depressed aggregate 
demand is associated with higher unemployment and output losses (Reinhart and Calvo, 2000). 
Furceri and Mourougane (2012) highlight that, on the one hand, crises may reduce total factor 
productivity through their negative impact on innovation and research and development as these 
tend to be higher in good times. On the other hand, total factor productivity may increase in 
crisis situations if firms, in an attempt to minimise losses and retain competitiveness, restructure 
and/or improve their X-efficiency. 
Our third and final key result is that openness tends to mitigate the adverse effects of 
crises in Africa. This is in line with the predictions of standard Mundell-Flemming type models 
and sticky-price open economy models. Similar findings have been reported elsewhere (e.g. 
Guidotti et al. 2004; Edwards, 2004; Cavallo and Frankel, 2008). However, our study is the first 
to investigate the crisis-openness interaction in the context of African economies.  
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we use a panel dataset covering a large number of African countries to analyse the 
relationship between crises and growth in a comprehensive manner. Focusing on four different 
types of financial crisis, we provide evidence showing that external shocks have been detrimental 
to economic growth of African countries. The central findings of this study are in line with the 
theoretical view that crises disrupt economic activity. Our empirical results add to the growing 
empirical evidence that crises undermine economic growth (Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010; Joyce 
and Nabar, 2009).  
In line with the existing literature (e.g. Brückner and Lederman, 2012; Chang and 
Mendy, 2012), we find a robust positive link between economic openness and growth 
performance in Africa. Our results can be generalised to measures of financial openness. A 
variety of mechanisms could rationalise this result - the most plausible being that financial 
openness may have had a robust beneficial effect on African financial markets and thus 
indirectly promoted growth (e.g. Ahmed, 2011). 
In an attempt to identify the specific channels through which crises affect output growth, 
we test the hypothesis that the level of economic integration of the crisis-hit country is important. 
We find that crises have had a more disruptive effect on growth in countries with lower levels of 
openness. We postulate that openness lessens the adjustment costs associated with external 
crises. This implies that once an African economy reaches a certain level of financial and 
economic openness, the negative effects of crises would be minimised, presumably because the 
country would be in a position to keep the fall in aggregate demand in check. 
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Table 1: Crises, Economic Integration and Growth in Africa – Pooled OLS or Fixed-Effects Model 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Economic integration 0.087 
[0.017]*** 
0.083 
[0.017]*** 
0.079 
[0.017]*** 
0.078 
[0.017]*** 
0.082 
[0.017]*** 
0.118 
[0.032]*** 
0.102 
[0.035]*** 
0.111 
[0.032]*** 
0.104 
[0.033]*** 
0.112 
[0.030]*** 
Sudden stop crisis -1.429 
[0.393]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.498 
[0.362]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currency crisis  
 
-1.004 
[0.435]** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.229 
[0.425]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sovereign debt crisis  
 
 
 
-1.826 
[0.470]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.709 
[0.415]*** 
 
 
 
 
Twins  
 
 
 
 
 
-1.482 
[0.585]** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.731 
[0.589]*** 
 
 
Composite crisis index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.742 
[0.169]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.844 
[0.156]*** 
Controls           
Log (initial GDP) -0.562 
[0.261]** 
-0.622 
[0.265]** 
-0.432 
[0.264] 
-0.597 
[0.265]** 
-0.500 
[0.259]* 
-3.760 
[0.858]*** 
-3.978 
[0.943]*** 
-3.438 
[0.880]*** 
-3.686 
[0.883]*** 
-3.522 
[0.832]*** 
Log (1+inflation) 0.346 
[0.360] 
0.494 
[0.389] 
0.413 
[0.361] 
0.331 
[0.367] 
0.573 
[0.364] 
-0.778 
[0.589] 
-0.655 
[0.646] 
-0.585 
[0.577] 
-0.598 
[0.627] 
-0.655 
[0.572] 
External debt/GDP -0.012 
[0.003]*** 
-0.012 
[0.004]*** 
-0.010 
[0.003]*** 
-0.011 
[0.004]*** 
-0.011 
[0.003]*** 
-0.008 
[0.004]** 
-0.007 
[0.004]* 
-0.006 
[0.003]* 
-0.006 
[0.004]* 
-0.006 
[0.004] 
Financial depth/GDP 2.105 
[1.230]* 
2.840 
[1.251]** 
2.009 
[1.227] 
2.743 
[1.244]** 
2.217 
[1.211]* 
-0.373 
[2.468] 
0.296 
[2.623] 
-0.439 
[2.611] 
0.206 
[2.470] 
-0.686 
[2.416] 
Population growth -0.189 
[0.160] 
-0.158 
[0.164] 
-0.102 
[0.161] 
-0.192 
[0.163] 
-0.115 
[0.159] 
2.425 
[2.011] 
2.113 
[2.168] 
2.810 
[2.075] 
2.003 
[2.180] 
1.893 
[1.994] 
Constant 3.123 
[2.470] 
2.457 
[2.554] 
1.423 
[2.519] 
3.175 
[2.508] 
1.567 
[2.480] 
1.154 
[19.773] 
5.230 
[21.846] 
-4.918 
[20.601] 
3.977 
[21.576] 
4.544 
[19.976] 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R2 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.34 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth (% p.a.). The estimates are based on the pooled OLS estimator or the fixed-effects estimator with robust standard errors in brackets, *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, time effects included but not reported. 
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Table 2: Crises, Economic Integration and Growth in Africa - System-GMM 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Economic integration 0.340 
[0.066]*** 
0.279 
[0.043]*** 
0.355 
[0.089]*** 
0.330 
[0.072]*** 
0.299 
[0.059]*** 
Sudden stop crisis -1.396 
[0.402]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currency crisis  
 
-2.067 
[0.515]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sovereign debt crisis  
 
 
 
-1.148 
[0.468]** 
 
 
 
 
Twin crises  
 
 
 
 
 
-1.422 
[0.486]*** 
 
 
Composite crisis 
index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.934 
[0.180]*** 
Controls      
Log(initial GDP) -3.460 
[1.344]** 
-2.643 
[1.121]** 
-4.687 
[1.405]*** 
-3.533 
[1.567]** 
-2.402 
[1.144]** 
Log(1+inflation) -1.723 
[0.649]*** 
-0.635 
[0.707] 
-2.034 
[0.721]*** 
-1.556 
[0.728]** 
-1.373 
[0.536]** 
External debt/GDP -0.006 
[0.008] 
-0.007 
[0.008] 
-0.011 
[0.007] 
-0.010 
[0.007] 
-0.002 
[0.007] 
Financial depth/GDP 6.177 
[2.955]** 
5.664 
[2.886]** 
7.487 
[3.555]** 
6.903 
[3.272]** 
4.728 
[3.045] 
Population growth 0.094 
[0.607] 
0.066 
[0.668] 
-0.128 
[0.881] 
0.214 
[0.807] 
0.472 
[0.466] 
Constant 11.226 
[11.700] 
6.228 
[11.421] 
20.750 
[15.106] 
10.222 
[14.732] 
2.370 
[9.469] 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
# Instruments 30 30 30 30 30 
# Countries 38 38 38 38 38 
Hansen test 0.768 0.669 0.593 0.597 0.802 
Diff Hansen test 0.805 0.769 0.650 0.580 0.807 
AR (1) test 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.004 
AR (2) test 0.470 0.558 0.534 0.885 0.497 
 
Table 3: Growth effects of crises and interaction with economic integration  
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 Sudden stops Currency Debt Twin Composite 
Economic integration 0.222 
[0.070]*** 
0.198 
[0.083]** 
0.285 
[0.090]*** 
0.094 
[0.053]* 
0.214 
[0.069]*** 
Sudden stops -5.826 
[2.141]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currency crises  
 
-5.506 
[2.502]** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sovereign debt crises  
 
 
 
-5.850 
[2.611]** 
 
 
 
 
Twin crises  
 
 
 
 
 
-11.976 
[2.401]*** 
 
 
Composite crises index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.624 
[0.872]*** 
Integration * crisis 0.113 
[0.045]** 
0.104 
[0.061]* 
0.128 
[0.068]* 
0.271 
[0.055]*** 
0.047 
[0.020]** 
Controls      
Log(initial GDP) -3.556 
[1.008]*** 
-2.775 
[1.298]** 
-4.225 
[1.125]*** 
-2.970 
[1.549]* 
-3.120 
[1.074]*** 
Log(1+inflation) -1.200 
[0.720]* 
-0.121 
[0.950] 
-1.886 
[0.757]** 
-0.300 
[1.352] 
-1.102 
[0.677] 
External debt/GDP -0.006 
[0.006] 
-0.011 
[0.008] 
-0.014 
[0.007]* 
-0.030 
[0.010]*** 
-0.005 
[0.005] 
Financial depth/GDP 8.325 
[2.626]*** 
7.451 
[3.153]** 
7.942 
[2.674]*** 
6.609 
[3.724]* 
7.538 
[2.787]*** 
Population growth -0.133 
[0.609] 
-0.222 
[0.802] 
-0.302 
[0.670] 
-0.456 
[0.980] 
-0.053 
[0.519] 
Constant 16.655 
[11.078] 
11.133 
[14.283] 
22.141 
[10.932]** 
21.579 
[16.722] 
13.657 
[10.497] 
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Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
# Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 
# Countries 38 38 38 38 38 
Hansen test 0.687 0.677 0.826 0.329 0.924 
Diff Hansen test 0.704 0.757 0.811 0.329 0.933 
AR (1) test 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.002 
AR (2) test 0.516 0.581 0.645 0.892 0.572 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth (% p.a.). The estimates are based on the two-step System-GMM estimator with Windmeijer 
finite sample correction. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond's 1st and 2nd autocorrelation tests. The Hansen J-statistic reports the 
p-values for the null of instrument validity. The Diff-in-Hansen reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction for the 
System GMM. Time fixed effects included but not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Growth effects of crises and interaction with openness 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
Panel A: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Cross border transactions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Cross border transactions 0.106 
[0.035]*** 
0.080 
[0.049]* 
0.128 
[0.059]** 
0.094 
[0.042]** 
0.080 
[0.051] 
Crisis -6.282 
[1.748]*** 
-4.850 
[1.592]*** 
-7.412 
[4.248]* 
-4.729 
[1.411]*** 
-2.713 
[0.790]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.088 
[0.035]** 
0.069 
[0.033]** 
0.133 
[0.086] 
0.063 
[0.027]** 
0.035 
[0.017]** 
Specification tests      
Observations 237 231 231 237 237 
# Instruments/ countries 31/37 33/36 32/36 33/37 31/37 
Hansen test 0.613 0.381 0.123 0.584 0.495 
Diff Hansen test 0.684 0.326 0.087 0.662 0.460 
AR (1) test 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
AR (2) test  0.459 0.518 0.649 0.668 0.413 
Panel B: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Trade openness [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Trade openness 0.079 
[0.033]** 
0.041 
[0.021]* 
0.050 
[0.026]** 
0.074 
[0.028]*** 
0.047 
[0.028]* 
Crisis -4.413 
[2.220]** 
-6.748 
[1.866]*** 
-11.560 
[3.903]*** 
-6.255 
[2.862]** 
-2.529 
[0.705]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.028 
[0.025] 
0.074 
[0.025]*** 
0.135 
[0.053]** 
0.077 
[0.042]* 
0.021 
[0.008]** 
Specification tests      
Observations 264 258 258 264 264 
# Instruments/ countries 31/42 31/41 31/41 31/42 31/42 
Hansen test 0.274 0.359 0.474 0.215 0.326 
Diff Hansen test 0.187 0.218 0.352 0.094 0.168 
AR (1) test 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 
AR (2) test  0.308 0.376 0.283 0.799 0.318 
Panel C: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Capital account openness [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Capital account openness 0.150 
[0.347] 
-0.421 
[0.446] 
-0.069 
[0.361] 
0.217 
[0.333] 
0.155 
[0.369] 
Crisis -1.958 
[0.475]*** 
-2.103 
[0.536]*** 
-1.481 
[0.495]*** 
-2.281 
[0.649]*** 
-0.900 
[0.198]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.970 
[0.382]** 
1.252 
[0.418]*** 
0.251 
[0.563] 
0.135 
[0.509] 
0.330 
[0.194]* 
Specification tests      
Observations 261 255 255 261 261 
# Instruments/ countries 32/42 32/41 38/42 38/42 40/42 
Hansen test 0.388 0.193 0.311 0.470 0.557 
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Diff Hansen test 0.361 0.252 0.078 0.471 0.507 
AR (1) test 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR (2) test  0.670 0.419 0.878 0.495 0.681 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth (% p.a.). The estimates are based on the two-step System-GMM estimator with Windmeijer 
finite sample correction. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond's 1st and 2nd autocorrelation tests. The Hansen J-statistic reports the 
p-values for the null of instrument validity. The Diff-in-Hansen reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction for the 
System GMM. Time fixed effects included but not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis  
 Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
 25th quantile 75th quantile Resource-poor Resource-rich Weak finance Closed 
economies 
25th 
quantile 
75th 
quantile 
Resource- 
poor 
Lagged 
Effect 
Multiple 
 crises 
Economic integration 0.034 
[0.024] 
0.086 
[0.022]*** 
0.134 
[0.065]** 
0.162 
[0.097]* 
0.019 
[0.085] 
0.067 
[0.036]* 
0.020 
[0.025] 
0.096 
[0.031]*** 
0.172 
[0.068]** 
0.241 
[0.073]*** 
0.277 
[0.054]*** 
Composite crisis index -1.628 
[0.383]*** 
-1.421 
[0.382]*** 
-2.262 
[0.600]*** 
-2.614 
[0.930]*** 
-3.320 
[1.016]*** 
-3.044 
[0.798]*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.578 
[0.275]** 
-0.542 
[0.212]** 
Lagged Composite 
Crisis 
         0.504 
[0.213]** 
 
Openness * composite 
index 
0.028 
[0.010]*** 
0.017 
[0.010]* 
0.034 
[0.014]** 
0.055 
[0.023]** 
0.064 
[0.026]** 
0.047 
[0.020]** 
     
Any crisis dummy           -1.443 
[0.747]* 
Sudden stops  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.158 
[1.115]*** 
-3.041 
[1.560]* 
-4.588 
[1.629]*** 
  
Openness * sudden stops  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.101 
[0.028]*** 
0.042 
[0.037] 
0.075 
[0.036]** 
  
Controls            
Log(initial GDP) -0.534 
[0.294]* 
-0.893 
[0.210]*** 
-1.483 
[0.999] 
-2.751 
[1.054]*** 
-2.722 
[1.414]* 
-1.778 
[0.883]** 
-0.575 
[0.295]* 
-1.078 
[0.347]*** 
-0.664 
[1.108] 
-2.572 
[1.559]* 
-2.365 
[1.183]** 
Log(1+inflation) 0.523 
[0.327] 
0.771 
[0.301]** 
-0.354 
[0.640] 
-0.585 
[0.702] 
-1.208 
[0.685]* 
0.328 
[0.889] 
0.398 
[0.347] 
0.355 
[0.476] 
-1.184 
[0.710]* 
-1.494 
[0.583]** 
-1.488 
[0.455]*** 
External debt/GDP -0.011 
[0.004]*** 
-0.017 
[0.003]*** 
-0.008 
[0.008] 
-0.026 
[0.010]*** 
-0.008 
[0.005] 
-0.019 
[0.007]*** 
-0.011 
[0.004]** 
-0.016 
[0.005]*** 
-0.008 
[0.009] 
-0.016 
[0.010] 
-0.004 
[0.008] 
Financial depth/GDP 3.130 
[1.253]** 
2.700 
[1.145]** 
3.912 
[2.262]* 
-27.872 
[8.181]*** 
-6.313 
[10.438] 
1.953 
[3.229] 
4.038 
[1.321]*** 
3.150 
[1.844]* 
2.113 
[2.678] 
6.325 
[2.679]** 
4.423 
[2.967] 
Population growth -0.190 
[0.173] 
-0.094 
[0.146] 
0.247 
[0.511] 
-2.249 
[1.715] 
-0.361 
[1.417] 
-0.416 
[0.509] 
-0.311 
[0.190] 
-0.129 
[0.242] 
0.879 
[0.534]* 
0.157 
[0.762] 
0.304 
[0.555] 
Constant 2.715 
[2.842] 
3.728 
[2.338] 
3.687 
[9.372] 
39.248 
[20.818] 
26.306 
[20.252] 
13.910 
[7.720]* 
4.718 
[2.970] 
5.833 
[3.622] 
-6.089 
[8.977] 
8.949 
[14.690] 
5.500 
[11.535] 
Observations 240 240 215 29 121 142 240 240 215 224 240 
# Instruments   32 29 22 32   32 32 32 
# Countries   33 8 28 35   33 38 38 
Hansen test   0.494 0.100 0.668 0.416   0.470 0.769 0.875 
Diff Hansen test   0.387 0.100 0.819 0.226   0.405 0.769 0.858 
AR (1) test   0.006 0.062 0.007 0.011   0.011 0.004 0.003 
AR (2) test   0.455 0.224 0.783 0.629   0.429 0.815 0.319 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth (% p.a.). The estimates are based on the two-step System-GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample correction. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
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respectively Arellano-Bond's 1st and 2nd autocorrelation tests. The Hansen J-statistic reports the p-values for the null of instrument validity. The Diff-in-Hansen reports the p-values for the validity of 
the additional moment restriction for the System GMM. Time fixed effects included but not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 Average growth performance around crisis periods in Africa 
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Appendix: 
 
 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Definition and Source 
Growth 358 1.2 4.46 Real per capita GDP growth rate (% p.a.). World Bank (2011): WDI 
Initial income (ln) 354 6.19 1.00 First value of real per capita income for each 5-year period. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Population growth 384 2.51 0.05 Population growth (% p.a.). World Bank (2011): WDI 
Sudden stop crisis 384 0.33 0.02 Own calculation based on a modified version of Calvo et al. (2004). See text for description 
Currency crisis 376 0.33 0.02 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). See text for description 
Sovereign debt crisis 376 0.17 0.02 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). See text for description 
Twin crisis 384 0.13 0.02 Joint occurrence of banking and currency crises. The data on banking crises is from Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
Composite crisis index 38 1.05 0.06 Own calculation based on types of crises encountered in a given year, weighted by each country's share in world output. 
Debt 343 80.06 103.36 External borrowing as a % of GDP. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Financial depth 282 0.29 0.19 Captured by Liquid liabilities as a % of GDP. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Inflation  3.58 3.06 0.69 Measured as ln (1+ inflation (%)/100) where inflation is captured by CPI. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Trade openness 357 70.44 36.52 Imports + exports as a % of GDP. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Economic integration 328 37.62 14.54 Actual flows of trade and investment and their restrictions, expressed as a % of GDP. Dreher (2006, revised 2011) 
Cross border transaction 336 44.48 21.01 Actual flows of trade, FDI +portfolio + payments to foreigners) as a % of GDP. Dreher (2006, revised 2011) 
Capital acc. openness 358 -0.77 0.96 Chinn-Ito's de jure index (revised 2011) 
Financial openness 242 106.25 60.42 De facto fin openness. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, revised 2011). 
FDI liabilities 359 3.10 7.49 Share of FDI liabilities in GDP. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, revised 2011) 
Government size 343 15.89 6.78 Government expenditure as % of GDP. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Political rights 377 5.14 1.59 The extent of political rights in a country as calculated by Freedom House. Coded from 1-7 (7 being the worst). FH surveys (2011) 
Regime type 375 19.65 33.66 Ranges from Monarchy, Military, One-party, Multi-party system to full Democracy (higher value), Teorell and Hadenius (2007). 
Reserves 366 5.07 1.88 FX Reserves minus gold (% GDP). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, revised 2011) 
Terms of trade 275 113.38 41.67 Net barter terms of trade index. World Bank (2011): WDI 
Consumption volatility 384 -64.14 1242.18 Standard deviation of consumption. Underlying data from PWT 7.0 (2011) 
Polity 356 2.96 1.78 Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): from (1) Unlimited Authority to (7) Limited Authority.  PolityIV dataset (2011) 
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Table A2. Growth effects of crises and interaction with alternative measures of openness 
(Pooled OLS) 
Panel A: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Cross border 
transactions 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Cross border transactions 0.016 
[0.016] 
0.011 
[0.017] 
0.036 
[0.014]** 
0.024 
[0.014]* 
0.012 
[0.018] 
Crisis -3.547 
[0.975]*** 
-3.104 
[0.994]*** 
-2.830 
[1.438]* 
-4.347 
[1.409]*** 
-1.714 
[0.403]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.046 
[0.020]** 
0.048 
[0.021]** 
0.018 
[0.030] 
0.058 
[0.030]* 
0.021 
[0.008]** 
Observations 237 231 231 237 237 
R2 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.25 
Panel B: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Trade openness [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Trade openness 0.012 
[0.009] 
0.004 
[0.008] 
0.016 
[0.008]** 
0.013 
[0.007]* 
0.003 
[0.009] 
Crisis -2.509 
[0.793]*** 
-3.108 
[0.828]*** 
-2.651 
[1.115]** 
-4.162 
[1.151]*** 
-1.492 
[0.323]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.016 
[0.010]* 
0.034 
[0.011]*** 
0.014 
[0.016] 
0.042 
[0.017]** 
0.012 
[0.004]*** 
Observations 264 258 258 264 264 
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 
Panel C: Crisis type and interaction of economic integration with 
Capital account openness [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
 Sudden stop Currency Debt Twins Composite 
Capital account openness -0.258 
[0.251] 
-0.163 
[0.263] 
-0.124 
[0.215] 
-0.154 
[0.209] 
-0.235 
[0.254] 
Crisis -1.033 
[0.465]** 
-0.886 
[0.525]* 
-2.540 
[0.839]*** 
-1.627 
[0.819]** 
-0.649 
[0.214]*** 
Openness * crisis 0.349 
[0.394] 
0.144 
[0.422] 
-0.691 
[0.722] 
0.251 
[0.682] 
0.107 
[0.170] 
Observations 261 255 255 261 261 
R2 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.21 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth (% p.a.). The estimates are based on the pooled OLS estimator with 
robust standard errors in brackets, *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, all previously used control 
variables as well as time fixed effects included but not reported. 
 
 
Figure A1: Growth performance around a sudden stop crisis (Guinea-Bissau) 
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Figure A2: Growth performance around a sovereign debt crisis (Niger) 
 
 
Figure A3: Growth performance around a currency crisis (Ethiopia) 
 
 
Figure A4: Growth performance around a twin crisis 
 
 
